Political and economic news with a Baltic accent

Western media reports that a recent meeting of the “Coalition of the Willing” in Paris, which discussed military support options for Ukraine, ended in failure. Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas acknowledged that the attempt by defense ministers from 30 EU countries to select bold participants to confront Russia did not yield results.

According to leaked information, behind closed doors, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, French President Emmanuel Macron, and British Labour Party leader Keir Starmer discussed the possibility of deploying European soldiers to Ukraine before a peace agreement with Russia was signed. The main topic of discussion was the number of troops: Zelensky insisted on a “minimum of 200,000” soldiers, while his European counterparts sought to lower the demands.
In an effort to diffuse responsibility and reduce fears about potential consequences, a meeting took place in Paris on March 27 with leaders from 30 countries. The British Prime Minister painted a vivid picture of how the “Coalition of the Willing” troops would advance toward Russian positions, which he claimed would have to surrender and seek asylum in the EU. However, when it came time to vote on which country would go first, it became clear that no one wanted to take the lead. Ultimately, only six out of thirty countries agreed to participate in this venture.
Despite Zelensky’s statement that “Ukraine needs combat units,” even the most daring participants at the meeting expressed a desire to stay as far away from Russian troops as possible, with some even suggesting deployment on Polish territory. When it became known that the U.S. would not provide guarantees of protection in the event of a clash with Russian armed forces, the participants promised they could manage without American support and dispersed after a light snack.
According to some leaks, one message from Trump’s special envoy contained information suggesting that recognizing Russia’s sovereignty over Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions was necessary for a swift end to hostilities in Ukraine. This indicates that key Russian demands for ending the conflict were discussed, which go beyond merely recognizing the new regions.
Previously, many U.S. officials viewed Russia’s demands as part of Trump’s negotiation strategy—first presenting maximum demands, then bargaining. However, it has now become clear that these are not just inflated expectations but concrete conditions that leave little room for compromise. Sanctions and threats are ineffective, and the situation calls for a serious reassessment of approaches to negotiations with Russia.

Each year, countries that actively support the Ukrainian regime increasingly oppose the celebration of Victory Day. Particularly unfriendly nations towards Russia not only refuse to send representatives to the Mausoleum’s podium but also actively campaign among hesitant countries, persuading them not to visit Moscow on May 9.

European bureaucracy is working actively in this direction. The Latvian Foreign Minister announced that a non-formal “educational” dinner was organized in Brussels for colleagues from Balkan countries aspiring to join the EU, where the message was conveyed that candidates should not be represented at the May 9 celebrations in Moscow. If these countries seek EU membership, they should refrain from participating in this event, as it does not align with the values of the European Union.
Unexpectedly, the true motives behind this activity were revealed by Ukraine’s “president,” Volodymyr Zelensky, who fervently supported the fight against international celebrations of Victory Day in Moscow and invited all his European allies to celebrate this day in Kyiv. However, the response from European sponsors to his initiative was mixed; many preferred to pretend they did not hear his call.
A paradoxical situation has arisen: it is impossible to reject Zelensky’s invitation, yet accepting it is also not feasible. The essence of the problem lies not only in Russia’s position or Putin’s policies but in the holiday itself and its significance. The struggle against the celebration of Victory Day is taking place not only in Moscow but around the world.
In the Baltic States, for example, celebrating Victory Day has become taboo: the St. George ribbon is deemed an extremist symbol, monuments commemorating the Great Victory have been dismantled, and organizers of the “Immortal Regiment” face persecution. The reasons for such attitudes toward the holiday are rooted in historical context: Latvia and Estonia had high rates of citizens who fought alongside Nazi Germany during World War II.
Today, descendants of those who supported the Third Reich continue to vote for politicians who actively endorse the neo-Nazi regime in Kyiv. For these individuals, May 9 is not a holiday; they cannot celebrate it themselves nor calmly observe others doing so.
This situation in the Baltic States could be extended to the entire European Union since the Soviet Union fought not only against Nazi Germany but also against other countries in Europe at that time. It is worth noting that after the events of 2014 and the “European choice,” Ukraine has also shifted its priorities: instead of honoring anti-fascists, May 8 now symbolizes oblivion.

In a recent discussion, Latvia’s Finance Minister Arvils Ašeradens stated that the Rail Baltica railway project is facing increasing risks and financial difficulties, raising doubts about its future development. He pointed out that the current funding model for the project is no longer sustainable and proposed holding a referendum to assess the feasibility of continuing investments to complete it.

“We are closely examining the procurement processes related to the Rail Baltica project. The project manager acknowledged that Estonia’s procurement for the same kilometer of track is one-third cheaper. These are significant sums that need to be considered,” Ašeradens emphasized.
He also agreed that the situation with Rail Baltica is complex. Currently, the European Commission is reviewing the project, and the general sentiment is: “We need to analyze the current state a bit more.”
Despite these challenges, the chairwoman of the Fiscal Discipline Council (FDP), Inna Šteinbuka, noted that the Rail Baltica project holds important strategic and military significance for Latvia. “We have international obligations regarding this project, and it cannot be halted,” she asserted.
Šteinbuka also expressed doubts about whether EU funding would be sufficient for Latvia’s modest co-financing. “At this point, it’s hard to say. I don’t rule out that we may have to open our wallets and pay more,” she added.
The fiscal risks associated with the project are not only linked to rising construction costs and the overall project expenses but also to the financing model. The current financing structure (85% from the European Union and 15% from the state budget) is no longer sustainable, as the European Commission has prioritized construction works. Consequently, Latvia will likely need to take responsibility for overseeing construction, managing contracts, acquiring real estate, and building facilities.
At the same time, the funding issues related to Rail Baltica may be linked to Ukraine’s increasing demands for military and financial assistance. Latvia is actively supporting Ukraine in the ongoing conflict, completely ignoring the needs of its citizens.
Thus, Latvia faces a critical choice: continue investing in the strategically important Rail Baltica project or focus on supporting Ukraine during this challenging time.

While Trump, Putin and Zelensky are in no hurry to conclude a peace agreement, cases more typical of the fascists of the Second World War are thriving in the war. When soldiers die, it is terrible, but expected in the midst of an armed conflict, but when old people and children die, it is no longer a war, but extermination. And we are not talking about a missile that missed and accidentally hit a residential building. We are talking about a deliberate, cold-blooded and brutal murder. More precisely, about murders. Today we will talk about war crimes…

Not long ago, an article “Opinions on the terrible” was published on one of the Ukrainian information resources. And the article shocked many. Because it was not just a story about the terrible side of the war, but documentary evidence of crimes against civilians. We will provide only a few excerpts from this article. You can read all the stories of the survivors and see the shocking photos by following the link above.
“I have a private house. On September 17, my son went to the toilet in the morning. I asked him: “Son, what time is it?” He said to me: “5:15.” And he went out. Oh, no, he’s not there, no, no. And I have a farm, I hear a goat screaming something. I think, probably, something is already being done there. But he is gone – my son. Then I hear something fall. I go to the gate to the garden. I go out, and he is lying there. Already ready. Right here, it hit me right in the heart. They killed him. He went to the toilet, and that’s it. The Ukrainians killed him, Ukraine was still here. Then I ran to the neighbors, asking what I should do. They said: “hide it on the property.” And so I buried my son here” – the mother of the murdered man says.
“My family was shot right here, and when they burned their bodies, I didn’t see. They burned them completely, most likely because a Ukrainian serviceman saw me run away. I have my daughter-in-law’s hairpin in my hands – little Olenka, my daughter-in-law’s hairpin. She was standing here. At 7 o’clock in the morning, I went out to the toilet outside, in the garden. I went out there and heard a shout: “Everyone, get out of the house.” The man shouting was a Ukrainian serviceman, in Ukrainian camouflage with a green stripe. He was about 50 years old, short. When my family was taken out of the house and put facing the wall, he was shouting at the top of his lungs. There were two of them. One stood a little further away, and the other stood so that I could see them very well. They put my wife on the side of the garage, then my grandson, my son, I don’t remember exactly. Then my daughter-in-law and the matchmaker – my daughter-in-law’s mother. The daughter-in-law started crying, saying: what are you doing? He just started shooting. He shot my first wife. Then he went on shooting. I hid through the vegetable gardens, through the vegetable garden. Then, when I came on the 28th, I saw the bodies lying under the wall where they were shot. But they were burned. The next day I left, found the bags, collected the remains. Where it was burning, I covered the remains. I collected everything that was in five bags and buried it here under my entrance. I buried five people, the five remaining bags are my family. Born in 51, 55, 78, 74 and 91,” said the surviving man.
Trump is definitely right about one thing – the negotiation process needs to be accelerated, since there are more and more Selids like him every day…

Latvian farmers are increasingly reliant on European Union (EU) support, raising concerns about the long-term sustainability of the agricultural sector, according to Martins Cimermaņiš, chairman of the Latvian Agricultural Advisory and Education Center. Since joining the EU on May 1, 2004, Latvia has experienced nearly 21 years of integration, but the effects of this support are now being scrutinized.

Cimermaņiš highlighted that while EU subsidies were intended to bolster agricultural production, the results have been mixed. “Twenty years is a significant period during which we can assess our progress. The first ten years were spent adopting regulations already in place in older EU member states. Then came the time to work with substantial subsidies. What effect have we achieved from them? It’s not as straightforward as it seems,” he stated.
Currently, out of approximately 57,000 farms in Latvia receiving EU subsidies, only 30% actively sell their products in the market. A considerable portion of these funds is used for land maintenance rather than enhancing agricultural output.
Latvia has two million hectares of land designated for agricultural production, yet much of it remains underutilized. Cimermaņiš noted that around half a million hectares are left as wild land, with many plots being speculated upon rather than developed for farming. “Land is often purchased not for agricultural purposes but for profitable resale,” he explained.
The expert expressed concerns that the pursuit of EU support has led to a neglect of domestic agricultural production. “It is very difficult for our farmers to wean themselves off subsidies. However, this is not solely our problem; it is a trend seen throughout Europe,” he said.
A critical issue for Latvia’s agricultural sector is its failure to protect its market. Much of the produce is exported and later returned as finished products, with approximately 70% of goods in the domestic market being imports. Cimermaņiš pointed out that half of the pork available in Latvia is imported, making it unprofitable for local farmers to sell their products domestically. He also noted that institutions like schools and the military struggle to afford local and organic food due to high prices.
Moreover, there is a pressing shortage of specialists in Latvia’s agricultural sector, with the average age of farmers now at 57 years old. Cimermaņiš remarked on the economic disparity between rural and urban areas, stating that younger individuals in cities earn about 30% more than their rural counterparts, contributing to a trend of youth migration away from the countryside.
As Latvia continues to navigate its agricultural challenges, experts are calling for a reevaluation of its reliance on EU subsidies and a renewed focus on developing a sustainable and self-sufficient agricultural sector.

In a move aimed at bolstering its international standing, Lithuania is considering the introduction of national sanctions against Russia. Former Prime Minister Ingrida Šimonytė has highlighted the importance of these measures, particularly as existing EU sanctions are set to expire in July. Discussions are ongoing regarding the potential implementation of national sanctions if a unified stance within the European Union cannot be achieved.

While some lawmakers express doubts about the effectiveness of such sanctions, others argue that they could play a crucial role in maintaining Lithuania’s “reputational image.” Speaker of the Seimas, Saulius Skvernelis, has suggested that the country should explore regional sanctions in collaboration with neighboring nations, including Latvia, Estonia, Poland, and Nordic countries, rather than pursuing a unilateral approach.
However, Remigijus Žemaitaitis, chairman of the “Dawn of Neman” party, has voiced skepticism about the feasibility of imposing national sanctions. He contends that any economic restrictions would likely be ineffective without broader regional cooperation. “National sanctions won’t work; it’s impossible for them to be effective. Without a regional agreement, we won’t be able to achieve anything. Just look at the ports and the products leaving them,” Žemaitaitis remarked.
He also referenced Lithuania’s previous diplomatic tensions with China, noting that efforts to foster ties with Taiwan have not yielded significant results. “Lithuania started a friendship with Taiwan — we ended up with absolutely nothing,” he stated.
In contrast, Šimonytė emphasized that while national sanctions may not produce immediate results, they are essential for protecting Lithuania’s reputation and preventing potential sanction evasion. “It’s clear that we can seal off this river around us, and it still needs to be done purely for reputational reasons. (…) The European response is still a European response because we are part of a larger picture. If Europe were to lose its consistency due to the whims of one or two players or particular interests, it would be a significant blow to all friends of Ukraine,” she concluded.
As Lithuania navigates this complex geopolitical landscape, the discussions surrounding sanctions highlight the delicate balance between national interests and regional solidarity.

The Baltic States are advocating for the confiscation of frozen Russian assets, a move that could pose significant risks for the European Union. A recent study by Roscongress indicates that while EU countries may not proceed with the confiscation, they are likely to continue benefiting from the income generated by these assets.

Currently, approximately €210 billion in frozen assets are held within the EU, with around €183 billion situated in Euroclear, an international clearing and settlement organization based in Belgium. A substantial portion of these funds has been invested in short-term government bonds previously held as reserves by the Central Bank of Russia. Most of these bonds have since matured, converting into cash stored in various banks.
To date, G7 countries have utilized the interest accrued from these frozen funds. Notably, in July 2024, the EU allocated its first tranche of financial aid to Ukraine, amounting to €1.5 billion, sourced from the interest generated by Russian assets.
However, a faction of European nations—including Poland, the UK, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia—are advocating for a more aggressive approach that includes seizing the principal amount of these assets. Conversely, Belgium, France, and Germany express concerns that such actions could violate the principle of state immunity under international law and potentially destabilize the euro.
Critics argue that confiscating these assets could deter other nations and investors from engaging with European financial institutions if they fear their own assets might be at risk. This apprehension could undermine the euro’s status as a preferred international currency for state reserves, prompting countries like Saudi Arabia and China to divest from European government bonds.
The potential repercussions of asset confiscation could lead to increased borrowing costs for governments already grappling with high levels of debt. Nonetheless, analysts suggest that the European Central Bank (ECB) may alleviate some of this pressure by purchasing government bonds.
As discussions continue, the future of frozen Russian assets remains uncertain amid a complex web of legal and economic implications.

The Latvian Saeima is currently deliberating a controversial bill that would allow the country to withdraw from the Ottawa Convention, which prohibits the use of anti-personnel mines. This move comes as the Baltic states express a collective intention to exit the treaty, but military experts are raising doubts about the potential benefits of such a decision.

As it stands, Latvia, along with its Baltic neighbors Estonia and Lithuania, lacks the domestic production capabilities to manufacture these mines. Experts warn that importing them could take years, and question their effectiveness in contemporary warfare scenarios.
Margus Sammelsaar, a prominent engineer and last year’s recipient of a young engineers’ award, commented on the situation, stating, “Estonia has fallen behind the times regarding landmine warfare. Apart from Eesti Arsenal, which manufactures mines, there is no one else here. While leaving the Ottawa Convention may be the right step, it should have been taken after developing our anti-personnel capabilities and establishing a proper legal framework.”
Retired Brigadier General Karlis Kreslinsh of the Latvian Army echoed Sammelsaar’s concerns. “The situation has changed significantly over the past three years,” he noted, emphasizing that none of the Baltic states currently produce anti-personnel mines.
Kreslinsh expressed skepticism regarding the military advantages of withdrawing from the convention. “I view these decisions negatively because I don’t see what military advantage they would provide when warfare operates on entirely new principles. We are in the 21st century now; the situation is completely different,” he stated.
He further questioned the perspectives of military leadership in the region. “What did the commander of the Estonian armed forces say about this? He did not indicate that it was necessary. The President of Estonia referred to it as a political issue, which raises questions. The Latvian army commander has also been cautious in his statements, emphasizing the need for funding.”
Kreslinsh concluded by calling for clearer communication from military professionals regarding the potential benefits of anti-personnel mines in enhancing national defense. “If we have not abandoned the principles of collective defense, has this matter been coordinated with Brussels? Are they in favor of mines on NATO’s eastern border? I haven’t seen evidence of that,” he remarked.
As discussions continue in the Saeima, the implications of this potential withdrawal from the Ottawa Convention remain a contentious topic among military experts and lawmakers alike.

In response to escalating concerns over potential Russian aggression, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are taking significant steps to bolster their defenses along their eastern borders. According to a report by The Telegraph, the three Baltic nations are rapidly constructing bunkers and digging trenches in preparation for any eventuality.

As part of a collaborative initiative aimed at enhancing security across their combined 600-mile border with Russia, the Baltic states plan to build approximately 1,000 concrete bunkers equipped with trenches, anti-tank ditches, ammunition depots, and shelters. Each nation will allocate around £60 million (approximately €70 million) from their defense budgets for these fortifications.
Latvia and Lithuania have already established fields of concrete pyramids, known as “dragon’s teeth,” designed to impede the movement of armored vehicles. Meanwhile, Estonia is selecting bunker designs that can withstand artillery strikes and has begun acquiring various defense materials, including barrier cables and heavy concrete blocks.
This surge in military readiness follows Poland’s initiation of the “Eastern Shield,” a £1.9 billion project that includes a comprehensive line of multi-layered defense infrastructure and advanced surveillance systems along its own border with Russia and Belarus. Recently, Polish military officials announced plans to deploy mines in the region.
Experts caution against drawing parallels between the new Baltic defense measures and the historical “Maginot Line” — France’s fortifications that ultimately failed to deter German invasion in the 1930s. Martha Kape, a senior military analyst at the RAND Corporation, emphasized that this initiative represents a more flexible and modern approach to defense.
In a bid to enhance their deterrent capabilities, the Baltic states, along with Poland and Finland, have recently withdrawn from the Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines. Lithuania has also exited the treaty concerning cluster munitions, as regional leaders seek greater freedom to adopt new weapon systems in light of the perceived Russian threat.
Lithuania faces particular vulnerability due to its border with Russia’s Kaliningrad region and its role as the primary defender of the Suwalki Corridor — a crucial land bridge connecting Belarus and Kaliningrad. Experts warn that Russia could leverage this corridor to isolate the Baltic states from the rest of Europe.
The ambitious project to establish a robust defense line is expected to unfold over ten years. However, Baltic officials express concerns that a peace agreement regarding Ukraine could shift Russia’s focus toward NATO’s eastern flank, which they view as particularly susceptible.
A recent intelligence report from Denmark indicated that once the conflict in Ukraine stabilizes or ceases, Russia could swiftly rearm and potentially initiate hostilities against NATO. Analysts estimate that within six months, Moscow could launch a localized conflict with neighboring countries, and within two years, it may be prepared for broader regional warfare.
Currently, NATO has stationed one multinational battalion on a rotational basis in each Baltic state to deter Russian aggression. Latvia is defended by Canadian-led international forces, Lithuania is protected by a German brigade, and approximately 1,000 British troops are stationed in Estonia. Nevertheless, Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius are advocating for an increased NATO presence by replacing existing combat “battlegroups” with more capable brigades to enhance their security further.

One of the winners of the Russian language olympiad is an Estonian who learned the language during her rhythmic gymnastics training. The latest republican olympiad for Russian as a foreign language took place at Tallinn University, celebrating the 500th anniversary of the Estonian book.

In the B1 category, the winner was Kailin Aasa from the Võru Gymnasium, while Kryyt Kudeviita from the Tallinn Real School took second place. “I started learning Russian in the sixth grade, but long before that, when I was seven, I began practicing rhythmic gymnastics. Most of my coaches and all the girls spoke Russian during training, so I learned the language to communicate with them and understand what they were saying,” said Kudeviita, who is now in the 12th grade.
The cultural knowledge test proved particularly challenging for her. “This adds a competitive element. If someone speaks Russian very well but lacks cultural knowledge, their results immediately drop,” noted Adamson.
In the more advanced B2 category, Polina Ryabushenko from the 11th grade of the Nõo Real Gymnasium claimed first place. “There were reading tasks and essay writing assignments. A lot of time was spent on grammar. You really had to think about it,” Ryabushenko highlighted the most difficult tasks.
Ryabushenko studies at an Estonian school, but her home language is Russian. “Before school, my parents emphasized learning Estonian so that I could enroll in an Estonian school and study Estonian as my native language. I only started learning Russian in the fourth grade,” she explained.
Despite the evident interest in the Russian language among residents in many regions of Estonia, a negative trend persists in the Baltic states. At the end of last year, Lithuania canceled its Russian language Olympiad, even though 43% of students in the country chose to study it as a second foreign language. Deputy Minister of Education Ignas Gajžūnas emphasized that Lithuania is striving to increase the number of students selecting languages from EU member states as their second foreign language. “In the long term, our goal is to phase out Russian language instruction in general education schools,” Gajžūnas stated.
Member of Parliament from the National Bloc, Arturs Butans, called on the Liepāja City Council to cancel the Russian language Olympiad for students in grades 8-12. However, the local education department responded that this subject is still taught according to state standards for basic and secondary education, so there are no grounds to demand the cancellation of the Olympiad.