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In the latest episode of the “In Between Europe” podcast, the hosts speak with Zsuzsanna Szelényi, an independent MP in the outgoing Hungarian parliament to make sense of Fidesz’s third supermajority and explore the future trajectory of Hungary’s politics. History Minute: Gramsci and the Rural Vote in Hungarian History.

In Between Europe is a podcast that discusses politics and current events in Central Europe, bringing you experts and a history minute for each episode. The show is hosted by Zselyke Csaky and Gergely Romsics.

Zselyke Csaky is a senior researcher at Freedom House’s Nations in Transit publication. She regularly writes about Central Europe and issues related to human rights.

Gergely Romsics is a senior fellow with the Research Center for the Humanities–Hungarian Academy of Sciences. His interests include the study of ideologies and political theory in Central Europe.

 

U.S. President Donald Trump along with his administration’s security aides mulled U.S. options on Syria, where he has threatened missile attacks in reaction to an alleged poison gas attack.

Concerns regarding a confrontation between Russia and the Western allies have been escalated since Trump said on Wednesday that missiles will be launched in response to a chemical gas attack in the Syrian town of Douma on April 7, and criciticized Moscow for siding with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The U.S. leader cooled his heated remarks on Thursday and while he discussed his military options with allies such as Britain and France, who could participate in any U.S.-led strikes on Syria, there were indications of efforts to stop the crisis from going out of control. Trump has spoken to British Prime Minister Theresa May on Thursday, while he is due to speak with French President Emmanuel Macron. Trump denied on Twitter that he said when an attack on Syria would occur, stating that it could happen ‘very soon or not so soon at all’. Later in the day, Trump convened with his national security team on the Syrian crisis. In a statement, the White House said that “no final decision” has been made and that they are continuing to evaluate intelligence and are in talks with partners and allies. But such statement did not necessarily indicate that Trump was pulling away from the idea of military action. Global stock markets showed signs of recovery after Trump’s hint that a military attack might not be imminent.

 

The U.S. government ran a $209 billion budget deficit in March as outlays grew and receipts fell, the Treasury Department said. That compared with a budget deficit of $176 billion in the same month last year, according to Treasury’s monthly budget statement.

When accounting for calendar adjustments, the deficit was $165 billion in March compared with an adjusted deficit of $134 billion in the same month the previous year. The deficit for the fiscal year, which started in October, was $600 billion, compared to a deficit of $527 billion in the same period of fiscal 2017. Unadjusted receipts last month totaled $211 billion, down three percent from March 2017, while unadjusted outlays increased to $420 billion, which is seven percent higher from the same month the previous year. The Congressional Budget Office had expected a $207 billion deficit for March. The nonpartisan agency said this March had one less business day than March 2017, and a smaller share of wage income is being withheld this year for taxes. The CBO recently forecast that the federal deficit will reach $804 billion in fiscal 2018, up from $665 billion in fiscal 2017. It increased its estimate for this year’s deficit mostly due to recent legislation that cut taxes and increased spending on the military and domestic programs. It had already expected widening deficits in the coming years as outlays, including spending on programs like Social Security and Medicare, rise faster than revenue.

In 2016, the European Union published its Global Strategy, the Union’s new foreign and security policy document. The strategy “promotes the ambition of strategic autonomy for the European Union.” American policymakers feel at least mixed with these aspirations. Several US officials have expressed the fear that a strategically autonomous Europe would be detrimental to the transatlantic alliance. Kay Bailey Hutchison, the US ambassador to NATO, warned against the direction of European plans for increased defense cooperation. Katie Wheelbarger, Deputy Chief Minister of International Security Affairs, said: “We do not want EU efforts to pull demands or forces from NATO into the EU.” Less than a year after President Donald Trump heated up the debate, the circle seems to be closing, going back to bygone times – when Washington warned Europeans against joining the United States in the 1990s States to “ally”.

There are many reasons to be skeptical about this new but age-old debate. First, Washington has a poor understanding of the current intra-European debate, its core idea of ​​strategic autonomy and its implications, a defect rooted in the fact that Europeans themselves have not fully defined the concept. Second, it is in America’s interest for Europeans to achieve (or at least approximate) strategic autonomy. Washington should support and support European efforts, in particular by assuring its skeptical allies across the Atlantic that it really wants a strategically autonomous Europe. Concern for Washington should not be that Europeans strive for strategic autonomy. The real concern should be that they may not succeed.

Strategic autonomy: confusion inside and outside the European Union

Since the publication of the Global Strategy, with its much-vaunted call for strategic autonomy, the Common Security and Defense Policy of the European Union has made great strides towards something vaguely similar to the concept. As a result of changes in the geopolitical environment and within the Union itself, notably Brexit, which internally voiced the need for European integration not to be dead, members have agreed on a number of measures, some of which are intended to bring about a series of measures Ability of states to carry out military operations. These include the extension of joint financing for EU battlegroups (the rapid reaction forces of the European Union have never been used due to the lack of political consensus); Establishing military planning and execution capacity for non-executive missions, such as training missions undertaken by States within the framework of the Common Security and Defense Policy; and Activation of Permanent Structured Cooperation, which enables “their military capabilities to meet higher criteria and have more binding commitments … to meet the most demanding missions”.

In addition, the coordinated annual report on defense should institutionalize systematic exchanges between Member States in order to identify and close gaps in military resources. Finally, a European Defense Fund should encourage cooperation in the development of defense capabilities and investment by co-financing initiatives in which Member States join forces to develop and procure products and technologies. In addition to taking economies of scale into account, the goal should also result in a consolidated European technology and industrial base for defense. Given its rather limited size, it remains to be seen whether the fund will have a profound impact on European industrial structures and policy preferences in arms acquisitions.

But none of these steps reflects a clear understanding of what “European strategic autonomy” would mean. Despite its emphasis on strategic autonomy, the global strategy document takes a more inward-looking approach, stating that the “European Global Strategy” starts at home. […] Adequate levels of ambition and strategic autonomy are important to Europe’s ability to promote peace and security within and beyond its borders. We will therefore step up our efforts in defense, cyber, counterterrorism, energy and strategic communications. “If Europe’s strategic autonomy in Washington is poorly understood, it’s because the situation in Europe is not very different, only France seems to have a clear idea of ​​the scope and content of the concept Defined in 2013 as the ability of the French state to decide freely and operate in an interdependent world, but this definition was particularly at the national level and not a collective European effort Most other Member States do not seem to have really thought about it For example, the term in its recent strategic documents: The German White Paper of 2016 contains neither a reference to the term nor the coalition agreement of 2018.

Certainly Europeans can be blamed for having taken the second step before the first one – to seek improvements in skills, operations and procurement, while avoiding the political dimension of strategic autonomy. Obviously, Europeans need to work on their operational autonomy (the ability to plan and carry out civilian and military operations on the basis of the necessary institutional framework and capabilities) and industrial autonomy (the capacity to develop and develop skills that are best suited to one’s own) operational autonomy are required). However, these two dimensions should be complemented by clearly defined foreign and security policy goals and an understanding of what tools are used in their persecution. Such a strategic vision of Europe’s security environment and the interests of the European Union, which should be pursued collectively or by individual members, is lacking for now. The flood of defense-centric initiatives without an accompanying discussion of political or strategic thinking behind them has, understandably, led Washington to fill the void with their worst-case thinking.

The US has nothing to fear

Although little is clear about Europe’s strategic autonomy, one thing is clearly defined that the concept does not mean that Europe is turning its back on the United States and on transatlantic security. Our private discussions with analysts and policymakers have shown that there are simply no demands for “strategic independence” from Washington or anything like that. Nobody in Europe is serious in this direction, not even the French. Although France first formulated the concept of strategic autonomy, this does not mean that Paris is pushing for the old dream of European emancipation from Washington. On the other hand. As Alice Pannier, last year’s French Strategic Review emphasizes that the United States is a “fundamental partner”. Paris’ general approach to defense cooperation under Macron is pragmatic: “Whatever works” is the key formula institutional attitudes come with special emphasis on operational cooperation.

Europe has outgrown its ideologically motivated efforts to counterbalance American power. Emancipation from the United States is no longer on the agenda for anyone. European governments recognize that the United States is and will remain its most important geopolitical ally. Likewise, nobody denies the role of NATO in collective defense. The debate on the strategic autonomy of the European Union concerns only crisis management and operations outside the Union, not the collective defense, the deterrence of Russia or the replacement of NATO – the EU Treaty of Lisbon makes it clear that it is the Common Security and Defense Policy Defense policy of the Union. Missions outside the Union for peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security. ”

It makes little sense, therefore, for American skeptics to oppose the Atlanteans, as if we were back in de Gaulle’s 1960s or post-Cold War 1990s. And on the other side of the ocean, US resistance to a strong Europe should be a thing of the past. It should be recalled that Washington’s views on European autonomy were not so long ago that President George W. Bush at the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008 encouraged the build-up of “a strong European defense capability”. Bush was right: strengthening the European Union as a security provider is the most important step towards a fairer transatlantic burden-sharing, a long-standing US claim on Europe. If Europeans take steps after Brexit to take their common security and defense policy seriously, that is good news for the United States. A strategically autonomous Europe is not a threat to transatlantic security, but a prerequisite for it, given the ever-shrinking resources, growing isolationist tendencies in America and a gloomy global security environment. US fears are out of place, as Brooks Tigner of Jane’s Defense Weekly notes in a well-informed analysis. Only a Europe that relies on the United States for almost everything can relieve US forces in various theaters in Africa and the Middle East, where both Americans and Europeans have interests that are more accessible.

A constructive role for Washington: The European skeptics must be reassured

The ball is clearly in the European court. Paul Zajac has rightly argued that Washington needs to find its own way for its European allies. As always, the duo that takes the lead in this process is the so-called Franco-German tandem. With President Emmanuel Macron’s clear ambitions for Europe and the Federal Government, fourth place for Chancellor Angela Merkel, the window of opportunity is finally open, even though political and cultural barriers are high. Together, Paris and Berlin can and want to devote themselves to operational and industrial cooperation, the development of skills and acquisitions.

But the one problem that France and Germany alone and the European Union can not solve calms fears in Warsaw and other skeptical capitals that a stronger European defense is incompatible with American involvement in European security matters. That’s where Washington comes in: It should assure its most Atlanticist European friends and allies in the north, and especially in the eastern part of the European Union, that a strengthened European defense does not mean the price of weak transatlantic ties, but rather the price has the opposite , Whether openly expressed as in Poland or more discreetly behind closed doors – the fear of alienating the US is the elephant in the European security debate. These skeptical countries, in fact, trust the United States far more than the Europeans in ensuring their survival.

In fact, strategic autonomy is not about choosing between “America” ​​or “Europe,” nor “reassurance” or “combating terrorists in the south,” another axis of disagreement between Western and Eastern European countries. If the fear of Washington’s alienation was off the table, Europeans could begin to discuss more constructively strategic autonomy and a strengthened defense. If Washington clearly expresses its support – and even its expectation – for increased European Union efforts, some nodes in Europe could be resolved. After all, most countries understand very well the need to invest in a strong national defense to secure their close bilateral relations with Washington. Why should not the same principle apply to the security relationship between the United States and Europe as a supranational entity? Supporting policymakers in the US could pave the way for Europe to fill the still unclear notion of strategic autonomy with operationalized meaning.

 

U.S. President Donald Trump warned Russia of an imminent military action in Syria over the alleged use of chemical weapons. The White House denied suggestions that the U.S. leader had announced his plans for military attacks through Twitter, stating that he had not fleshed out a timetable for the course of action on the matter, that all options were still up for consideration and he was studying on how to respond.

President Trump also lambasted Moscow for standing by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Trump’s tweet was in reaction to a warning from Syria that any U.S. missiles fired at Syria over the suspected poison gas attack on the rebel enclave of Douma near Damascus would be shot down at the launch sites targeted. Damascus and Moscow have denied responsibility for the incident, stating it was bogus. According to the World Health Organization, there were dozens of fatalities and hundreds were injured in the attack. U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, taking a cautious tone after Trump’s threat of missile attacks, said the U.S. was evaluating intelligence regarding the suspected poison gas attack. He added that the U.S. military was prepared to provide military options if needed. In Vladimir Shamanov, the head of a Russian parliamentary defense committee, said Russia was in directly communicating with the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff about the situation. Oil prices surged to their highest level in over three years on Wednesday after Trump’s warning, and U.S. stock index futures declined sharply due to concerns about a potential Russian-U.S. conflict over Syria.

After March 1, a new diplomatic reality was born, and to deny it is stupid. The important thing is how our political elite reacts to this. Perhaps, traditionally – will continue to frighten all and ask NATO for more security guarantees? Maybe, the leading politicians will understand, this is the last chance to leave rhetoric and start acting to reduce tension.

The message of Russian President Vladimir Putin to the Federal Assembly is in a hurry to explain in its own way in the world, in Europe and, of course, in Latvia. Someone saw there only ostentatious bravado, a bluff in the interests of the pre-election campaign. Others are sure that a new arms race has begun, to which Washington has even managed to respond.
However, the leitmotif of the Russian leader’s speech – to the stormy applause of the audience – was a clear, but at the same time precisely measured challenge to the “golden billion” – the Western world, its order and values. This is a categorical requirement “to accept us as we are.” At the same time, not switching over the “red lines” in opposing themselves as the enemy of the US and the EU.
No one considers the Communist West China, the Wahhabi Saudi Arabia, the “new-Muslim” Turkey to be the enemy of the West. And also Egypt, governed by the “special democracy” regime of General Abdul Fattah al-Sisi. Both Washington and Brussels accept them “with all cockroaches.” The US president was angry at the export of cheap steel, not a one-party system or a censored Internet. Russia demands – and, it seems, will receive – the same attitude to itself.
I would like to hope that restraint will become the main feature of all NATO decisions in the near future. This will preserve a place for the maneuver in relations with the Kremlin and not allow security risks to become a reality. If the one who challenges, tries to “corner,” it will be a fatal mistake for the West. Every experienced hunter will tell you what the beast can do in a desperate situation …
In the further reaction of the West to Russia’s challenge, there are two possible scenarios – among them a militant one, and not just a peacekeeping one.
The foreign policy of the countries of Eastern Europe, and the Baltic states in particular, exploit the ideological legacy of George W. Bush about the United States as a world policeman, who can punish every infringer – and even a potential – Western order. The recent “dismantlings” of Trump with North Korea can be considered proof.
Therefore both Latvia, and its neighbors do not stop solving important foreign policy tasks, openly intimidating society with an eastern threat. This was the way to ensure accession to NATO, a referendum on accession to the EU was held, and even the euro was introduced.
After the annexation of the Crimea, the intimidation of the people became so hysterical that it became even boring. As a guarantee of security, NATO’s military detachments began to demand “hostages”.
What now, after March 1, will our president and the National Security Council do? Will all bells ringing, will more foreign “hostages” be asked, will NATO call on us to deploy tactical nuclear weapons?
But the fact is that the more impressive “powder cellar” will be made, as it were, in the name of the Baltic security, the greater the tension between NATO and Russia. And the risk will increase to make Latvia and the Baltics an arena of struggle between the two military powers. After all, something can go wrong: a soldier will give up his nerves and a finger will tremble on the trigger, will one plane fly too close to another – or some political radical will arrange a provocation to “once and for all” cut the “Gordian knot” .
Then we, Latvians and Latvians, become slivers of the saying “the forest is being cut down, the chips are flying.” Like the Song Festival, the Freedom Monument, the Latgalian Mara and the Rezekne Gors, the Dine Cabinet and the Slitere Forest, and so on, and so on. And the survivors are unlikely to be comforted by the fact that “our people won” …
Yes, consider me an alarmist, but after the constant forcing of a hybrid, or a “simple” war, accustomed. The sense of danger is dulled, and we can no longer imagine that all these horrors can really come true.

Now we should be afraid of the politicians themselves – perhaps, at least, the instinct of self-preservation will force them to get out of “military boots”. The example of South Korean diplomacy, which began “separate” talks with Pyongyang, was very timely. They lived for decades in an atmosphere of possible aggression. Millions of mines were buried in the ground, the military budget was growing, the country, with the help of pro-American policy and the constant presence of the US military contingent, learned to rely on the help of the overseas power.
People were so intimidated by the Communists’ invasion that flags of the neighboring country and dolls of three generations of Kim were burned in the streets. (In this sense, we only reached the cross with a nailed dummy “reminiscent of Putin.”) But at the moment when Kim Jong-un and Trump began to measure, whoever has a “nuclear button is more beautiful”, Seoul’s politicians themselves were frightened in earnest. They realized that the US president has ambitions and opportunities to send Kim the third to the dump of history, but the entire Korean peninsula will be “tampered” with it. Frightened politicians realized that the time had come for cardinal diplomatic maneuvers in order not to give everything to the mercy of a great but irritated comrade-in-arms.
If we can not ourselves reduce the overall heat, then, perhaps, it is worthwhile not to interfere with those who know how. Western countries have been able to get on with “ideologically hostile” neighbors since the Cold War. The experience of Finland is even more valuable – they know how you can not only be a border state, but also earn on it.
To the horror of the Baltic political elite, among the “old Europe” there are enough offers, how you can “lure the bear” again – to use Moscow’s ambitions in favor of the EU countries. To deny real politics and engage in sabotage would be the height of idiocy. Because for us – the border countries and frontier peoples – somewhere there is always looming the option “and if they perish” …

Jānis Urbanovičs

President of Moldova, socialist Igor Dodon, was suspended from his duties by the decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova. The reason was due to his repeated refusal to sign the appointment of the parliament’s nominee for the position of Minister of Defense. Igor Dodon, being a supporter of the military neutrality of Moldova, considered his both candidates to be “the hawks and supporters of rapprochement with NATO, insisting on the appointment of more neutral candidates, but his request was rejected by the parliamentarians, and the President’s counterpart, Prime Minister Pavel Filip, and the Constitutional Court found a way to force in the Parliament’s decision bypassing the head of state in return.

The removal of the socialist President will be effective until the signing of the nominee of the minister by Prime Minister Pavel Filip or the speaker Andrian Candu, and Moldovan experts attribute this decision to the pressure from the Moldovan oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc, who is considered to be the “master of Moldova” and one who controls all politicians in the Republic without exception, including President Dodon.

«Dodon is forced to put up with the decision of the Constitutional Court and he w never be able to escape from the influence of Plahotniuc,” Pavel Grigorchuk, a communist and a political prisoner in the past, is certain. «Dodon will not argue with an unprecedented decision of the court since the elections won by Igor Dodon were the result of no less voluntaristic judicial verdicts. Alas, our Constitutional Court has long advocated not as an independent judicial body, but as an institution that takes political decisions”.

Let me remind you that until quite recently, according to the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, president of the country was elected by the Parliament. The amendment to the Basic Law therewith, which opened the way for the head of state nation-wide election, was not adopted in a constitutional way, that is, through the procedure for amending the law on the elections and the appropriate noting in the parliament, but by the decision of the same Constitutional Court.

«Tie vacuum of legitimacy caused by the questionable decision of the Constitutional Court regarding the removal of the President, whose election is also controversial from the point of view of the Moldovan laws, but gained legitimacy due to the popular vote, meets the interests of the only person in the country – Plahotniuc”, said Grigorchuk in a telephone interview. “Plahotniuc used Dodo” who contributed to the election of the oligarch as Vice-President of the Socialist international, an Influential worldwide Organization. Now that the President has fulfilled his mission, Plahotniuc gracefully crossed him to pursue his policy, which is very far from the goals and objectives of the international socialist movement.

So what is the position of Vladimir Plahotniuc and why did he so urgently need the duties of the Minister of Defense were assigned not to the acting person to the fully functional minister, who is even the member of the hawk camp?

The answer to his question should obviously be sought in the relations between Moldova and the self-proclaimed state of Transnistria (the Moldovan Transdniestrian Republic) – anenclave that separated from Moldova during the collapse of the USSR and pressed between Moldova and Ukraine. In 1991-1992 the breakaway region, populated mainly by the Russians, the Moldovans, and the Ukrainians, reflected a military attempt to restore Moldova’s sovereignty on its territory and its security is ensured by the Russian military forces under the UN mandate.

The relations between the Republic of Moldova and the Moldovan Transdniestrian Republic are the subject of long term of negotiations. At the same time, the prospect of restoring sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova over the rebellious republic directly depends on the negotiation process and the fulfillment of a number of agreements by the parties, including many points, namely, the restoration of trade relations, the development of cooperation in trade, economic and law enforcement sphere, the unhindered movement of people and goods through checkpoints on the line of delimitation, the refusal to prosecute the participants in the armed conflict, etc. However, to begin with, we are talking about mutual respect for the political system, which naturally formed on the territory of both entities formed on the territory of the Republic of Moldova.

The implementation of these initiatives should be facilitated by the election of

Socialist President Igor Dodon, who took a measured stance on the Transdniestria matter and promised to seek restoration of friendly relations with the Russian Federation, stumbling block which was “the Transdniestria matter”. And this approach is shared by the majority of Moldovan citizens, as evidenced by the election of the conditionally pro-Russian politician Igor Dodon by direct voting instead of the secret negotiations that are customary for the Moldovan politics on the margins of the Parliament.

In the meantime, the possibilities of Igor Dodon turned out to be significantly limited by the position of the Parliament, since the adoption of political decisions under the conditions of the parliamentary-presidential republic is the prerogative of the Parliament completely controlled by Vladimir Plahotniuc.

An important factor of the Moldovan politics is also the Romanian lobby, which casts doubt on the sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova by placing the stake on the incorporating of Moldova to neighboring Romania. Due to the longstanding domination of pro-Romanian forces in the Moldovan politics, Romanian was declared the state language of Moldova, while the Moldovan language was declared only its dialect, and school and university history textbook consider the history of Moldova exclusively in the context of the Great Romanian region. Igor Dodon’s attempts to make these matters available for a referendum and, at the same time, receive tools of effect on the Parliament through a nationwide referendum were blocked by the decision of the Constitutional Court. At the same time, five of the six judges who banned the referendum and later removed the postwar period. Furthermore, the issue of the territorial integrity of Serbia was then ignored by the majority of the participants in the General Assembly. The convergence of Moldovan hawks with Ukraine, which turns not only into a source of military instability in Europe, but also into a militarized state entity that is unable to resolve military and political problems at home, but ready to saber at the first opportunity, and especially where there is a possibility to annoy the Russian Federation. Kiev has been accusing Russia of conducting military operations in Donbass for three years, but hasn’t yet provided convincing evidence from the point of view of international instances.

If at the early stages of the Transdniestrian conflict at least the Ukrainian radical nationalists acted on the side of Transdniestria, thus, defending the Ukrainian population, along with other people opposed to the policy of violent Romanianization, today their position is determined not by the interests of the Ukrainians, but by the mode of denying separatism around the world. On October 4, 2017, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine agreed to sign an agreement with the Republic of Moldova on joint control of the goods supplied at the border checkpoints between Ukraine and the MTR, while the interests of the MTR were not taken into account. The checkpointsas part of this initiative located on the Ukrainian territory were complemented by Moldovan border guards, which is considered by the Transdniestrian side as a step aimed at preparing a total blockade of Transdniester, and in case of military operations against the MTR by Moldova, Ukraine will most probably act as an ally of Moldova.

Moldova’s sabotage of a peaceful dialogue between Kishinev and Tiraspol concerns not only the military sphere. In particular, preliminary agreements were not reached by the Moldovan Parliament during the negotiations regarding the registration of automobile license plates issued in the MTR in Moldova. So far, vehicles with Transdniestria numbers cannot cross the Moldovan-Romanian border and move around the territory of the European Union. In the course of peaceful negotiations, the proposal of the Transdniesterparty on the introduction of neutral license plates for trucks was repeatedly discussed. The similar sample numbers should not contain images of state symbols of Transdniestria or Moldova, and this proposal was approved by all international mediators.

However, due to the position of the Moldovan side, the decision on this issue has not yet been made, but of progress the situation is deteriorating. In particular, the increasing number of menaces have been heard from Kishinev on the introduction of a similar ban on the movement of cars with Transnistrian registration also on the territory of Ukraine, which, given the current position of Kiev, sounds quite convincing.

Equally alarming is the campaign launched in the press controlled by Vladimir Plahotniuc. So, the young politician Dmitry Voloshin, who positions himself as very successful in all spheres of “ubermensch”: a businessman, an intellectual, an athlete, “an iron man”, a traveler, an icon of the creative class and a patriot of

Moldova, published a resonant article on his own web-site calling at the world community to exert pressure on Transdniestria to achieve accession to Moldova with the help of external forces. It is easy to assume that this is the way in which a powerful propaganda campaign is launched in the Moldovian society at breaking the existing status quo in Moldova’s relations and the self-proclaimed MTR,           aimed at worsening the relations between existing subjects and the breakaway of the road map. This state of affairs cannot but arouse fears of every clear-sober European. It seems that the Moldovan politics, orchestrated by Vlad Plahotniuc, takes the «Ukrainian course» artificially inflame nationalists sentiments, militarize the society and radicalize it, which in the near  future may turn into a new bloody conflict in the southeast of the continent. Furthermore, the prospect of drawing external players into the conflict – Russia, Romania and Ukraine-threatens to turn the whole region Into a zone ortota chaos and war.

David Abischer

In Poland, on April 2, a controversial law on the appointment of judges will come into force. The Council of Europe on March 29 issued a report in which the Polish judicial reform is severely criticized. The Group of Council of Europe against Corruption (GRECO) – the special committee of the Council of Europe – in its 15-page document concluded that the laws on the reorganization of the Supreme Court and the National Council of Justice “seriously violate” the anti-corruption norms in Poland.

These laws provide an opportunity to exert direct influence of the executive and legislative authorities on the appointment and dismissal of judges in all Polish courts. The organization called on Poland to change the laws so that at least half of all members of the National Council of Justice appointing judges could choose the judicial community itself, and not the parliament.

The report of the Council of Europe’s anti-corruption committee is criticized as the premature retirement of members of the Supreme Court of Poland, allowing the authorities to get rid of obstinate judges, and the possibility to extend the tenure of judges in office, which the president receives. The Minister of Justice, who is also the Prosecutor General, will have too much influence under the new laws, experts criticize. In their view, the independence of the judiciary as a whole is threatened.

The Council of Europe last December initiated an accelerated verification procedure for Poland, after the country’s government ignored criticism and recommendations from both the CoE and a number of other international organizations. This is the first such case in the history of the Council of Europe, founded in 1949. The organization, uniting 47 states, one of its main tasks sees respect for human rights and the principles of the rule of law. The Council of Europe, which is headquartered in Strasbourg, is not an EU structure.
Since 2015, the national-conservative party “Law and Justice” ruling in Poland is reconstructing the justice system. She explains her actions by appointing a liberal government that was ruling before that, or by the fact that judges have held their posts since the time of the communist regime.

The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, dealing with issues of constitutional law, negatively assessed the judicial reform in Poland, calling it a threat to the rule of law and violation of the principle of separation of powers. The Government of Poland ignored this report, although it itself instructed it to prepare. In turn, the European Union also repeatedly called on Warsaw to change the disputed laws and to engage in a dialogue with Brussels on legal issues.

The first signs of readiness for dialogue in Warsaw appeared only after in December last year, Vice-President of the European Commission France Timmermans opened a penalty procedure against Poland under Article 7 of the EU treaty. After the beginning of the procedure, which provides for various sanctions, up to the deprivation of the violating country’s right to vote, the new Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Moravetski twice visited Brussels and discussed the Polish reform with the leadership of the European Commission. Although he himself showed impetuousness, the Polish ambassador to the EU said that Warsaw intends to submit amendments to the laws.
Last week, the European Commission confirmed receipt of the letter and is studying it, the EC representative said. Until mid-April, Brussels will announce whether Poland’s proposals are sufficient to prevent a “systematic threat to the rule of law”. After this, the EU Council of Ministers will decide on the continuation or termination of the penalty procedure in accordance with the 7th article of the EU treaty. To make a decision, it is necessary that it is approved by four fifths of the EU countries.

Critical of the Polish judicial reform were not only the Council of Europe and the European Union, but also the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the European association of judges. The European Commission threatened in the future to provide structural assistance to the countries of the community only if they observe the principles of the rule of law. However, to implement this idea, all EU countries, including Poland, should support it in the negotiations on the formation of a new EU budget.

It has long been recognized that the closer alignment between Moscow and Beijing that goes back nearly three decades now provides each with ample political and diplomatic benefits. A less well explored aspect of the relationship could examine how these partners learn from one another in various domains, including in the crucial area of strategy. I have pointed out in this forum before that Chinese strategists have looked carefully at the war in Ukraine and the related Crimea annexation. This edition of Dragon Eye takes a close look at a Chinese assessment of Russia’s military intervention in Syria.

China’s interpretation of the Syrian War could turn out to be quite significant. I have recently argued in that Beijing could play a major role as one among several disinterested (and thus neutral) major powers in helping to fashion a diplomatic solution to the Gordian knot that is the Syria situation today. Such a role would be quite consistent with its ambitions to be a genuinely global power, providing global public goods for international security, and simultaneously facilitating the opening of vast trade corridors spanning Eurasia. Yet, there is a potentially darker side of China’s examination of the Syrian War. Indeed, there is a danger revealed in this late 2017 study published in the journal Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies of the prestigious Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Put simply, that danger  is that Chinese strategists could conclude that the Russian war in Syria provides a valuable paradigm for possible future Chinese uses of force in distant theaters as “anti-terrorism military operations.”

This treatment of Russia’s war in Syria assesses the intervention as providing “numerous benefits,” over and above speeding the destruction of ISIS. The intervention, according to this rendering, also significantly increased Russia’s standing in the world, altered the international system, increased Russians’ self-confidence, and also “seized the initiative in the struggle with the West.” The author characterizes the Kremlin’s actions against Ukraine in 2014 as “resolute [毅然决定],” but also notes that Russia suffered serious economic consequences as its trade fell off precipitously, so that the poverty level exceeded 15 percent of the Russian population, as related in this Chinese study. Thus, it is recognized that President Vladimir Putin made the ruling to intervene in force in Syria “… against the complex background of Russia confronting relatively difficult external and internal” circumstances.”

It is noted that the Syrian War has afforded Moscow a “test of the results of its military building program in recent years and the results of reforms.” At the grand strategic level, the Chinese strategist suggests that the Kremlin views Syria as its “advanced post [前哨]” near the gate of the eastern Mediterranean. Thus, the intervention is also interpreted as confronting NATO pressure against Russia’s southern flank. The piece, moreover, lays out the case for why Russia’s intervention could be legal, while the U.S.-led coalition “has not received either the agreement of the UN Security Council, nor the blessing of the Syrian government.” The Chinese assessment also sounds a bit naïve in wholeheartedly embracing the Kremlin’s explanation that Russia “…is only fighting terrorism, and is not supporting any particular political force …”

Addressing momentarily the arguments of skeptics, this analysis explains that “… for Russia, it is important that it not be drawn into a long war…” It is noted that the West has begun to talk about Russia’s “second Afghanistan.” But the author sees Moscow executing a “new type of war,” relying on such methods as long distance precision strikes, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), surprise, and signals intelligence. Putin is cited approvingly as underlining the importance of preemptive attack against international terrorists. The piece suggests that Putin has the backing of a broad internal consensus in Russia to fight against terrorism, perhaps arising from the fact cited by the author that Russia is a country that has suffered greatly at the hands of terrorists. By relentlessly fighting against terrorism, the author explains, Moscow has been able to portray itself as “the real friend of the Arab World.” Moreover, Russia’s Syrian War has, according to this Chinese assessment, “broken the West’s hegemonic position in the region.”

One of the most interesting sections of this paper is an evaluation of the information war about Syria that has been underway between Russia and the West. The author notes that the West led by the United States has used “all means available,” to unleash propagandistic attacks “to smear Russia to the highest degree” with the hope of sparking a “‘colored revolution’ that overthrows Putin.” The paper even goes so far as to tabulate (literally in a table) almost a dozen discreet efforts to paint Russia as a “wicked imperialist power” as a part of the “information war””.